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Quantum Closures and Disclosures creates an 
intersection for two exciting but, at first sight, 
irreconcilably remote discourses: quantum brain 
dynamics and post-phenomenology. Quantum brain 
dynamics (QBD) - the application of quantum field 
theory to the study of the brain - is a research area 
initiated, in part, by Giuseppe Vitiello’s book My 
Double Unveiled (2001). In contrast to classical 
phenomenology (or at least that of Husserl; post-
phenomenologists still don’t agree on Heidegger), 
which reserved a special transcendental task for 
philosophy, non-essentialist post-phenomenology is 
willing to engage in a dialogue with other views, 
including naturalism. 
 
Professor Globus’s earlier book on the connection 
between natural sciences and postmodern theory, The 
Postmodern Brain (1995), argued for a view in which 
neuroscience and Heideggerian (and also Derridean) 
thought are combined. In Quantum Closures and 
Disclosures the gears have shifted somewhat. No 
longer is standard neuroscience matched with 
postmodern philosophy; on the contrary, standard 
neuroscience is criticized through QBD. But the spirit 
of the undertaking remains: to find places of 
resonance where QBD and post-phenomenology 
agree and open up a common space of investigation.  
 
However, to say that the book is an attempt to 
connect two distant disciplines is not the whole story. 
It also presents something that, for want of a better 
word, could be called a “vision”: an ontological view 
of the human condition tout court, and as such a view 
that is not included in either QBD or postmodern 
theory. Like all views of this magnitude, it is hard to 
summarize. However, the kernel of the vision is the 
thought that a living, quantum dynamically 
functioning brain is a unique locus where both the 
existence of a world and our experience of it are 
created. Globus takes from QBD the idea that there 
are two quantum universes, both of them unpresent. 
One of these is the quantum universe familiar from 
quantum mechanics (“our” universe). The other 
universe, called the ~universe, “interacts” with our 
(non~)universe in vacuum states where quanta are 
exchanged. The idea is that the brain, unlike any other 
entity, is able to control the functioning of these 
vacuum states. In the interaction, in the “between” of 
the non~universe and the ~universe, a world is “lit 
up” - the analogy being to Heidegger’s notion of 
Lichtung, the clearing where truth happens. The 
Lichtung is constrained by the input from the “reality” 
of the non~universe, as well as the attunement 
provided by the ~universe. (The interactions between 
the universes, more precisely the recognitions of input 
by the ~universe resulting in “presence”, are “traced” 
by holes or defaults in the non~universe; Globus’s 
QBD is non-Hermitean, and the brain is treated as a 
dissipative system.) The ontological point is that 
presencing is achieved in a participatory process that 
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Globus calls “the ~conjugate match”. 
 
As a result of the match, the presencing quotidian 
world is experienced. However, ontologically it is 
only an illusion that is dependent on the two non-
presencing quantum worlds. In this sense, our 
experienced world is “a veil of maya”. This claim 
might not be that strange, but the second conclusion is 
one that few in the history of philosophy have been 
willing to embrace: because the ~conjugate match 
producing presence is a unique achievement of the 
quantum brain, experienced worlds are Leibnizian 
monads.  
 
It is almost too easy to criticize an attempt at 
“thinking together” of misunderstanding or even 
misrepresenting one of the two discourses. Therefore 
it is important to emphasize that there is a beauty, as 
well as considerable theoretical leverage, involved in 
presenting an ontological vision, in general, and in 
Globus’s view, in particular. Having said that, one 
obvious “cheap shot” of criticism cannot be avoided. 
The privileged locus of Globus’s vision is the brain 
that creates and sustains the possibility of a world 
being “lit up”. A major structural problem with such 
privileged loci is the question of knowledge: how do 
we know about the quantum brain and its true 
functions? The problem is evident in the way that 
Globus gives prominence to the scientific knowledge 
about brains (fundamental to the theme of the book 
being the catchphrase “no brain, no Dasein”). The 
criticism of the circularity involved in such a process 
of privileging is well-known from Husserl and 
Heidegger: the natural attitude is naïve in that it 
presupposes certain things (such as the brain, the 
psyche, and the brain-psyche correlation) as the basis 
for identifying objects in nature; therefore the birth of 
the objects (or of objectivity) cannot be explained. 
Husserl makes the point most lethally in his 
Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft (1965): naïve 
natural science cannot, on pain of circularity or 
elimination, explain experience or subjectivity, since 
these have not once been observed in “nature”. 
 
As Globus argues, the quotidian world is a victim of 
this circularity. The question is, then, to what extent 
the natural sciences are imprinted with the natural 
attitude. Both Husserl and Heidegger thought that 
natural science is doomed to naïvety (especially in 
respect of the subject-object distinction). There might 
be ways of doing natural science in a non-naïve way, 
as some of the post-phenomenologists Globus 
discusses have argued, but such non-naïvety means 
that the circularity has to be dealt with. Here the 
circularity is included in the scientific knowledge/ 
presuppositions (QBD) concerning the existence of 
the objects (the brain) that are used in explaining the 
properties (how the subjective, monadic world and 
the scientific knowledge included in it are created) of 
the objects themselves. Non-naïvety comes at a price; 
the establishment of the subject and the object has to 
be derived from a more primordial level that has both 
logical and explanatory priority. Even though Globus 
rightly criticizes some of the metaphysical 
assumptions included in Vitiello’s theory, it is not 
clear that his view of QBD escapes the Husserlian 
problem of circularity.  
 
In any case, the criterion of success for an enterprise 
of “thinking together” cannot be (only) the 
correctness of the interpretations, but the openings, 
promises and discoursive energizations that it 
enables. For researchers working with questions 
involving the quantum and continental themes in the 
philosophy of mind, Globus’s book provides ample 
inspiration. Even though parts of it are highly 
technical, it is written in an accessible way. One of 
the most interesting parts is Chapter 2, which includes 
a comparative discussion of three influential 
contemporary post-phenomenological writers, Hubert 
Dreyfus, Pauli Pylkkö, and Arkady Plotnitsky. The 
way in which Globus charts their (and Heidegger’s 
and Derrida’s) post-phenomenological views is most 
lucid, making the chapter well suited to the purposes 
of a university course on post-phenomenology. 
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